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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
BETWEEN SPOUSES: NEW MEXICO'S EXCESSIVELY
HIGH THRESHOLD FOR OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT
TIFFANY OLIVER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in New Mexico have made it prohibitively difficult for a spouse to recover
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.' Pursuant to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm." 2 Although New Mexico recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, there has never been a reported case in which a mentally or
3
emotionally abused spouse received compensatory damages for this tort claim.
Over ten years ago, in Hakkila v. Hakkila,4 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
overturned a district court's judgment awarding damages for a spouse's intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and since that time this claim has not been
recognized in the spousal context. As a result of the Hakkila case, New Mexico has
fallen out of step with developing law in the rest of the nation and fails to protect
spouses who are mentally or emotionally abused by their significant others.5
This comment will argue that New Mexico's excessively high threshold for
outrageous conduct creates a difficult, if not impossible, standard of proof for
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in the context of marriage. The
initial problem this comment addresses is that of interspousal immunity, which once
barred all tort actions between spouses.6 This comment will go on to examine the
development of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress both in the
United States and in the State of New Mexico. It then analyzes New Mexico's
rationale for its failure to recognize this claim in the marital context. Next, this
comment details how other jurisdictions deal with this issue of law by exploring the
types of conduct these jurisdictions consider sufficiently outrageous to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. This comment will conclude with a
critique of New Mexico's legal inconsistencies with both the case law of others
states and its own judicially created body of law.
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Rachel Gudgel, Susan Johnson, and Valerie Thomas for their superb editing abilities and willingness to devote their
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I. See generally Hakkila v.Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(l) (1965).
3. See infra section Il.C.

4. 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
5.

See infra section il.

6. See infra section I.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of InterspousalImmunity in America
At common law, under the "unity of person" doctrine, a woman was slightly more
than a piece of property whose legal existence was merged into that of her husband,
thus making it impossible for her to bring a claim against him.7 In order for a wife
to sue or be sued in a court of law, the husband had to be joined with the wife in the
suit, because she had no legal identity of her own. Because of this joinder, the
husband became liable for the torts that his wife committed.9 This theory made it
impossible to maintain a tort action between husband and wife.'°
Whether it was the husband or the wife who brought a tort claim against the
other, the mandatory joinder made the husband the benefactor of the award." For
example, if a husband committed a tort against his wife, in order for the wife to
bring a suit against him, she would have to join her husband as a plaintiff in the
suit. 2 If she won the suit against him, the damages would have to be paid by the
husband to himself.'3 Likewise, if the wife was the tortfeasor, the husband would
have to be joined as a defendant and would ultimately be liable to himself for his
wife's tort.' 4 As a result, under the "unity of person" doctrine, interspousal suits
proved to be an ineffective means of tort remedy. 5
Beginning in 1844, the rights of married women were substantially improved
with the widespread adoption of the Married Women's Property Acts.' 6 These
statutes gave married women a separate legal identity, the right to sue and be sued,
and property rights of their own.' 7 Although the Married Women's Property Acts
abolished the "unity of person" doctrine for purposes of property torts, they did not
eliminate spousal immunity for personal torts.' 8
With the elimination of the legal fiction of "unity" of spouses, courts developed
other rationales in order to continue to uphold interspousal immunity. Chief among
these rationales was the theory that personal tort actions between husband and wife
would disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony of the home.' Second, courts

7. JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 194

(2d ed. 2001).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F(b) (1977).

9. id.

10. Id.
II. Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
At common law a husband was liable for the torts of his wife, for the law supposed that a wife
acts under her husband's direction. "If the law supposes that, said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat
emphatically in both hands, the law is an ass-an idiot. If that's the eye of the law, the law is a
bachelor; and the worst I wish the law is, that his eye may be opened by experience...."
CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 394 (Everyman Ub. ed., 1940) (cited in JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 362 (4th ed. 1998)).
16. DOMICK VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 575 (1998).
17. Id.
18. GREGORY, SWISHER & WOLF, supra note 7, at 194.
19. VETRI, supra note 16, at 575.

20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 895F(d) (1977).
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expressed concern that spouses might conspire to commit fraud against liability
insurance companies that covered tort injury.2 The last attempted justification for
failure to recognize these interspousal claims was that recognition of such claims
might encourage spouses to bring frivolous actions against one another. 22 Courts,
however, 23have gradually refuted these rationales for upholding interspousal
immunity.
Today, "[t]he common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity has been fully
or partially abrogated in almost every jurisdiction." 24 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts announces, "the indications are clear that the complete abolition of immunity
between husband and wife is the future state of the law in all states., 25 The abolition
of interspousal tort immunity is largely attributable to the widespread adoption of
the principles set forth by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Thompson v. Thompson.26
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Response to InterspousalImmunity
In 1910, the U.S. Supreme Court made its one and only ruling on interspousal
immunity in Thompson v. Thompson,27 and while the Court upheld interspousal
immunity, the case is most notable for its riveting dissent by Justice Harlan. Justice
Harlan argued that since the District of Columbia's Married Women's Property Acts
allowed for a wife to independently bring tort actions and did not exclude her
husband from those she could bring suit against, the wife was allowed to "sue
separately as fully and freely as if she were unmarried, for torts committed against
her. '2' Harlan further argued that if interspousal tort claims were "undesirable on
grounds of public policy, it is not within the functions of the court to ward off the
dangers feared or the evils threatened simply by a judicial construction that will
defeat the plainly expressed will of the legislative department. ' 29 The dissent in
Thompson is said to be "the first substantive break with immunity, marking the
commencement of its erosion, a process that continued throughout the twentieth
century."3
After Thompson, courts and legislatures across the country began to modify the
doctrine of interspousal immunity, and by 1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
recognized the legal demise of the doctrine.3 The Restatement explicitly declares,
"A husband or wife is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason
of that relationship. ' 32 "Most states have finally adopted Justice Harlan's dissent in

21. VETRI, supra note 16, at 575.
22. Id.
23. Kristin Krohse, No Longer Following the Rule of Thumb-What to Do with Domestic Tortsand Divorce
Claims, 197 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 926 (1997).
24. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (5th ed. 1984).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F(f) (1977).

26.
(1977)).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

218 U.S. 611,619-24 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 895F(f)
218 U.S. 611.
Id. at 622 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 621 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 399 (1989).
Krohse, supra note 23, at 927-28.

32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F(1) (1977).
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Thompson, which suggested that Congress could not have intended a wife
be able
33
to sue her husband for an injury to her property but not to her person.
C. The Abolition of Interspousal Immunity and the Development of Intentional
4 in New Mexico
Infliction of Emotional Distress1
Historically, New Mexico followed the common law rule that damages for
emotional distress, absent physical injury, are not recoverable.35 In 1972, however,
36 began its incremental abolition of
New Mexico, in Mantz v. Follingstad,
interspousal immunity and development of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.37 In Mantz, although the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient
proof of the claim, the court acknowledged that intentional infliction of emotional
distress constituted a new tort theory in New Mexico.38 The following year, in
Flores v. Flores,39 New Mexico went further and abolished interspousal immunity
for intentional torts.4 ° Just two years later, in Maestas v. Overton,4 the New Mexico
Supreme Court abolished interspousal immunity for negligently inflicted torts.42 In
1981, Dominguez v. Stone4" became the first case in which the New Mexico Court
of Appeals recognized that an issue of fact existed as to intentional infliction of
M In Trujillo v. Puro,45 New
emotional distress thus requiring review by a jury."
Mexico expanded its law even further when it made it clear that there is no
requirement of bodily harm in order to recover damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. ' In the final decision in this line of cases, Hakkila v. Hakkila,47
the court turned all of these decisions on their heads when it determined that a
husband who slammed a camper shell on his wife's head, verbally abused her in
private and in public, and battered her failed to meet the legal standard of
outrageousness necessary to prove a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 48 Following is a detailed description of this legal progression of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in New Mexico.

33. Krohse, supra note 23, at 927-28.
34. Also known as the tort of "outrage." Stock v. Grantham, 1998-NMCA-081, 33, 964 P.2d 135.
35. X.E. Acosta, The Tort of "Outrageous Conduct" in New Mexico: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Harm Without Physical Injury, 19 N.M. L. REV. 425, 426 (1989).
36. 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).
37. Acosta, supra note 35, at 446.
38. Mantz, 84 N.M. at 479, 505 P.2d at 74.
39. 84 N.M 601, 506 P.2d 345 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).
40. Id. at 602, 506 P.2d at 346.
41. 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (N.M. 1975).
42. Id. at 214, 531 P.2d at 948.
43. 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
44. Id. at 215, 638 P.2d at 427.
45. 101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
46. Id. at 414, 683 P.2d at 969.
47. 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
48. Id. at 179, 812 P.2dat 1327.
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1. Mantz v. Follingstad9 -New Mexico Adopts the Restatement's Version of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In 1972, the New Mexico Court of Appeals acknowledged the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress for the very first time in Mantz v. Follingstad ° In
Mantz, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant doctor caused her severe emotional
distress when he performed a mastectomy without properly informing her of her
medical options." The Mantz court discussed the leading decision on intentional
52
infliction of emotional distress in the country at that time, Rockhill v. Pollard,
an
Oregon decision that already had adopted the definition expressed by the
Restatement of Torts.13 Following Oregon's lead, the court in Mantz chose to adopt
the Restatement's version of the tort; however, it found no facts to prove that the
defendant intentionally engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused
severe emotional distress. 4 Despite the court's denial of Mantz' claim, the court of
appeals acknowledged that intentional
infliction of emotional distress constituted a
55
new tort theory in New Mexico.
2. Flores v. Flores56-- Interspousal Immunity Crumbles for Intentional Torts
One year after Mantz, the court in Floresv. Floresheld that a spouse may sue the
other for intentional torts. 7 In the instant case, Mrs. Flores brought a tort action
against her husband to recover for the injuries she sustained as a result of his
intentional stabbing of her with a knife. 8 The court asserted that "[t]he common law
rule is not to be applied to bar suits between spouses because liability free
intentional injury to one's spouse does not reflect the circumstances in New
Mexico."59 This decision thus abolished interspousal immunity for intentional torts.
The Florescourt further recognized the invalidity of the argument that permitting
suits between spouses would flood the courts with trivial matrimonial disputes.6 °
The court offered proof of this by pointing out that jurisdictions that permit spouses
to sue for intentional torts had not been inundated with groundless claims.61 With
this holding, the court acknowledged that interspousal immunity was no longer
applicable; however, it did not address whether a tort action may be brought against
a spouse absent physical injury.62

49. 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 476, 505 P.2d at 71.
52. 485 P.2d 28 (Or. 197 1) (holding that when a doctor failed to examine the plaintiff and her ten-month-old
child after an automobile accident in which they sustained visible injuries and the mother thought her child was
dead, plaintiff provided sufficient evidence for the case to be submitted to the jury for determination of whether
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the plaintiff existed).
53. Mantz, 84 N.M. at 479-80, 505 P.2d at 75.

54. Id. at 480, 505 P.2d at 74.
55. Id. at 479, 505 P.2d at 74.
56. 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).
57.

Id. at 602, 506 P.2d at 346.

58. id.
59. Id. at 603, 506 P.2d at 347.
60. Id.

61. Id.
62. Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 214, 531 P.2d 947, 948 (N.M. 1975).
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3. Maestas v. Overton 63-Interspousal Immunity Abolished for Negligent
Torts
In 1975, New Mexico abolished interspousal immunity for negligently inflicted
torts in Maestas v. Overton.' This wrongful death action, brought between the
respective personal representatives of a married couple that died in a plane crash,
alleged that the wife's death was due to the husband's negligence in piloting.65 The
New Mexico Supreme Court, following the Restatement, found that there was no
immunity from tort liability between spouses by reason of their marital
relationship.66 The Court reasoned that because Flores held that interspousal
immunity no longer exists for intentional torts, there was "no logical or legal reason
for drawing a distinction between interspousal personal torts intentionally inflicted
and those negligently inflicted."67
4. Dominguez v. Stone68-New Mexico Recognizes a Claim of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress That Is Appropriate for a Jury Determination
While Mantz was the first New Mexico case to acknowledge the existence of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Dominguez v. Stone was the first case in
which an issue of fact was found to exist as to this cause of action.69 In Dominguez,
the defendant, a member of the governing body of the village, made derogatory
statements to the effect that the plaintiff, a twenty-two-year-old Mexican National
who had been residing in the United States since she was three years of age, was not
qualified for her position as director of the village's senior citizens program because
she was a "Mexican.,"70 The court, in applying Section 46 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, held that an issue of fact did exist as to intentional infliction of
emotional distress and further held that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment and dismissing the claim.7'
Dominguez was the first reported case in which a New Mexico court was
presented with facts sufficient to warrant ajury determination on whether intentional
infliction of emotional distress had occurred.72 The plaintiffs emotional distress
centered around a meeting in which the defendant made multiple derogatory
comments about her alienage and ethnicity. 73 Specifically, the defendant stated that
the person performing the duties of program director should not be a "Mexican"
because the program was funded by American tax dollars.74 The defendant
additionally interrogated the plaintiff concerning payment of income and property

63. 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (N.M. 1975).
64. Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 213, 531 P.2d at 947.
Id. at 214, 531 P.2d at 948.
Id.
97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 215, 638 P.2d at 427.
Id. at 212, 638 P.2d at 424.
Id. at 215, 638 P.2d at 427.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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taxes, whether she possessed a green card, whether she had applied for U.S.
citizenship, and whether she had registered to vote in the United States.75 The court
determined that these actions were extreme and outrageous enough to have inflicted
76
emotional distress upon the plaintiff.
5. Trujillo v. Puro77-New Mexico Acknowledges There Is No Requirement
of Bodily Harm in Order to Recover for Intentionally Inflicted Emotional
Distress
In Trujillo, the court held that there is no requirement that the plaintiff suffer
bodily harm in order to recover for intentionally inflicted emotional distress. 78 In this
case, the defendant doctor's delay in responding to complications resulting from a
cataract removal surgery he performed resulted in the plaintiff s loss of vision in his
right eye.79 The plaintiff alleged that, upon informing the doctor that he was
experiencing a sharp pain in his eye, the doctor failed to schedule an appointment
or make arrangements for him to see another physician and the doctor intentionally
included false statements in his hospital records, failed to note in his records a
telephone call received from the plaintiff, and falsely testified that he never received
a telephone call from the plaintiff.8" The court held that these allegations were
enough to sufficiently state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
thus preclude a motion to dismiss.8" Further, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that the patient's complaint should be dismissed because he failed to
allege the existence of any physical injury attendant to his claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.8 " In its holding, the court announced that "[t]here is
no requirement that plaintiff suffer bodily harm in order to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, although he may recover for such harm if it results
from such conduct. 8 3
6. Hakkila v. Hakkila84-New Mexico's Refusal to Take the Next Step
In Hakkila, the New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that a husband's insults
and outbursts over the course of a ten-year marriage were not sufficiently outrageous
to establish liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.85 Mr. Hakkila
perpetually called his wife crazy and incompetent, accused her of preferring women
to men, and went into screaming rages.86 Once, when Mrs. Hakkila approached her
husband at a Christmas party to suggest they go home, Mr. Hakkila began
screaming, "You f
bitch, leave me alone," causing Mrs. Hakkila to have to

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 414, 683 P.2d at 969.
Id. at 410, 683 P.2d at 965.
Id. at 414, 683 P.2d at 969.
Id.
Id.

83. Id. at 414-15, 683 P.2d at 969-70.
84. 112 N.M 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

85. Id. at 179, 812 P.2d at 1327.
86. Id. at 173-74, 812 P.2d at 1321-22.
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excuse herself and walk home alone. 87 During another argument, Mr. Hakkila went
as far as locking his wife out of the house overnight in the dead of winter.88 These
actions, however, were not found to be extreme and outrageous enough to state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 89
Even though the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
require that physical injury accompany the emotional distress, the court found that
the physical abuse Mr. Hakkila inflicted upon his wife also failed to rise to the
necessary standard of outrageousness. 9° Mrs. Hakkila was the victim of numerous
physical abuses. Once, while Mrs. Hakkila was putting groceries into their camper,
Mr. Hakkila "slammed part of the camper shell on her head and the trunk lid on her
hands."'" During another argument, Mr. Hakkila "grabbed his wife and threw her
facedown across the room into a pot full of dirt., 92 There was also evidence
presented that Mr. Hakkila grabbed his wife's wrist during an argument and twisted
it severely. 93 All these physical and emotional abuses, which ultimately led to Mrs.
impairment, were not found to be legally actionable
Hakkila's disability and
94
court.
the
by
behavior
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as Applied to Hakkila
95
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which New Mexico adopted in Mantz,
states, "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. 96 The
of emotional distress is limited to conduct that is
tort of intentional infliction
"extreme and outrageous." 97 The Hakkila court offered several reasons for imposing
this limitation: (1) to prevent burdensome litigation of the commonplace, (2) to
protect privileged conduct, and (3) to avoid groundless allegations of causation.98
The concerns that "necessitate limiting the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress" 99 are discussed below.
1. Preventing Burdensome Litigation of the Commonplace
The Hakkila court worried that recognition of interspousal claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress might lead to courts being burdened by the litigation
of commonplace marital occurrences." The court commented that "[c]onduct
intentionally or recklessly causing emotional distress to one's spouse is prevalent
87. Id. at 174, 812 P.2d at 1322.
88. Id.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 179, 812 P.2d at 1327.
Id.
Id. at 174, 812 P.2d at 1322.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179, 812 P.2d at 1327.
84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS § 46 (1)(1965).
Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324.
Id. at 177, 812 P.2d at 1325.
Id.

100. Id.
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in our society."'' The court went on to say that "[t]his is unfortunate but perhaps not
surprising given the length and intensity of the marital relationship."' 10 2 Here the
court seems to indicate that abusive behavior happens so much that it should be
excusable and further suggests that the court must be surprised by a spouse's
conduct in order to establish a cause of action. The fundamental purpose of the
judicial system is to afford individuals a day in court in order to redress injury:
potentially legitimate claims surely should not be excluded because they may be
burdensome or commonplace.' 0 3
2. Protecting Privileged Conduct
The Hakkila court seems to be solely concerned with the privileges and privacy
of the accused. 1'° In quoting the Restatement's section 895F(h), the Hakkila court
stated that "[p]artners who are pledged to live together for a lifetime have a right to
criticize each other's behavior."'0 5 Here, the court seems to be saying that husbands
have the privilege of inflicting emotional distress upon their wives. 06
' The court
commented that "[c]ourts must recognize that we are not yet as civilized as we
might wish. Many, if not all, of us need some freedom to vent emotions in order to
maintain our mental health. The law should not require a degree of civility beyond
our capacity."107 This seems to indicate that the court finds it permissible for a
husband to maintain his mental health at the expense of his wife' s. 08
'
According to the court, there may be a protected liberty interest in conduct that
might tend to impose emotional distress. '9 The court stated, "Intentionally making
another person unhappy or upset may also serve useful purposes besides simply
preserving the mental health of the perpetrator" and suggests that such behavior may
be justified to serve the greater social good or the recipient's own good." 0 In
concluding that conduct causing emotional distress may have social utility, the court
focused on the rights of the aggressor and ignored the rights of the victim
altogether."'
3. Avoiding Groundless Allegations of Causation
The Hakkila court expressed concern that extending the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress may lead to spouses attempting to seek redress for
groundless claims." 2 To bolster this argument, the court cited the Restatement,
which remarks,
101. Id. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324.
102. Id.
103. Tobias, supra note 30, at 461.
104. Rhonda L. Kohler, The Battered Women and TortLaw: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence,
25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1059 (1992).
105. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 177, 812 P.2d at 1325 (citing Constance Ward Cole, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Among Family Members, 61 DEN. U. L. REV. 553, 574 (1984)).
106. Kohler, supra note 104, at 1059.
107. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324.
108. Kohler, supra note 104, at 1059.
109. Id.
110. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324.
111. Kohler, supra note 104, at 1059.
112. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 177, 812 P.2d at 1325.
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The intimacy of the family relationship may.. .involve some relaxation in the
application of the concept of reasonable care, particularly in the confines of the
home. Thus, if one spouse, in undressing leaves shoes out where the other
stumbles over them in the dark, or if one spouse spills coffee on the other while
they are both still sleepy, this may well be treated as not negligence." 3
Certainly there is a distinguishable difference between the benign action of a spouse
leaving a shoe out and the calculated, intentional action of a spouse locking the other
out of the house overnight in the dead of winter, as was the case in Hakkila."4 While
it is understandable that the standard of reasonable care should be more flexible in
the home, courts must not allow serious injuries to be swallowed up by this less
stringent standard of reasonable care.
Fraudulent claims might also fall under the umbrella of groundless allegations
that the court so feared. The possibility of fraud exists in every negligence action
involving an insured tortfeasor." 5 Further, it is suggested that domestic violence is
lied about at the same rate as other crimes-about two percent of the time." 6 As a
result, it is no more necessary for the court to worry about fraudulent intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims than it does any other tort action." 7
From the critic's vantage, judicial recognition of intentional infliction of
emotional distress between spouses poses the threat of opening up the floodgates to
a host of frivolous litigation.' Assuming arguendo that a rash of lawsuits could
result, such fear is hardly a justification for refusal to recognize the cause of
action." 9 William Prosser commented, "It is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such
grounds." 2 °
There are several levels of legal safeguards in place to guard against the
possibility of opening up the floodgates to nonmeritorious claims. 12 1 First, Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places an obligation on lawyers to certify,
under the threat of sanctions, that the claim they are bringing is not frivolous or
"presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."' 12 2 This rule also applies to
unrepresented parties. 123 Additionally, per the Restatement, judges are required to
review the facts and make a determination as to whether the conduct in question
"may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit

113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 895F(h) (1977).
114. Hakkila, 112 N.M at 174, 812 P.2d at 1322.
115. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 960 (N.J. 1978).
116. Information and Resources for Survivors and Their Supporters 21 (Haven House, Rio Rancho, New
Mexico) (date unavailable) (on file with the NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW).
117. See infra section ll.D.3.
118. Meredith Taylor, North Carolina's Recognition of Tort Liability for the Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress During Marriage, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1261, 1278 (1997).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971)).

121. Taylor, supra note 118, at 1279.
122.
123.

FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b).
Id.
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recovery."' 24 In this way, judges act as gatekeepers ensuring that only valid claims
reach the jury. 125 Once the claim reaches the jury, it must survive yet another
screening by the jurors, many of whom are themselves married and in the best
possible position to determine what behavior between spouses is atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 126 As a result of these multiple reviews,
groundless claims for intentional infliction of emotional27 distress are screened out
and courts need not worry about burdensome litigation. 1
E. ProceduralConcerns in Recognizing Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
In addition to the three concerns specifically expressed by the majority opinion
in Hakkila, courts are faced with the problem of whether to try tort claims together
with or apart from divorce proceedings.' 28 "While the New Mexico Court of Appeals
did not have to address the issue of joinder in its opinion in Hakkila, Justice
Donnelly wrote a concurring opinion, which suggested precluding either permissive
or compulsory joinder of interspousal tort claims."' 29 Additionally, Justice Donnelly
suggested that "where a tort claim for [intentional infliction of emotional distress]
is joined with an action for dissolution of marriage, [the better procedure for the trial
judge to follow] is to bifurcate the tort claim from the trial of the divorce
proceedings so that the tort claim may be tried separately."' 130 While Justice
Donnelly discusses the problems with joining tort claims with divorce proceedings,
he fails to address the benefits.
1. Joinder versus Separation of Divorce and Tort Actions
It is left to the courts to determine whether the claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress should be brought with or separate from divorce proceedings. '31
Because the same set of facts are often involved in both actions, trying them
together allows attorneys and parties to discuss the facts only once, which makes the
litigation process shorter and thus less costly.132 This model additionally promotes33
judicial economy and allows for the emotional toll on the parties to be lessened.
For these reasons, joinder of intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claims
with divorce is a more favorable approach than requiring each case to be tried
individually.
Opponents of joining the two claims argue that tort claims and divorce
proceedings should be tried separately because of their distinct purposes. 134 It is

124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46(14)(h) (1965).

125. Taylor, supra note 118, at 1279.
126. Henricksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Me. 1993).
127. See infra section H.D.3.
128. Brandi Monger, Family Law-Wyoming's Adoption of IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress in
the MaritalContext. McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P. 3D 1162 (WYO. 2001), 2 WYo. L. REV. 563, 574 (2002).
129. Id. at 575.
130. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 183, 812 P.2d 1320, 1331 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
131. Monger, supra note 128, at 574.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 575.
134. Id. at 575-76.
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pointed out that the purpose of a tort claim is to redress a legal wrong with damages,
while the purpose of a divorce proceeding is to dissolve the marital relationship
between the parties. 35 To further this argument, opponents assert that while divorce
is equitable in nature, and therefore not subject to a jury trial, a tort claim is a
question of law and may involve a jury trial. 136 This argument ultimately fails
because the overarching rules of civil procedure allow the joinder of all claims a
party has against the opposition. 37 While divorce and tort claims have distinct
purposes, the benefits of joining the two claims substantially outweigh critics'

expressed concerns. 138

2. Res Judicata
Courts that try divorce actions separate from tort actions may encounter
complications regarding res judicata of claims. 139 When a final decree of divorce is
granted without express adjudication of the claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the legal doctrine of res judicata could potentially bar a spouse
from bringing such a claim in the future. 4 ' This is the case in jurisdictions such as
Texas, where the transitional approach to res judicata is followed.' 41 Under the
transitional approach, parties are not only precluded from bringing a second action
on issues that have already been litigated, they are precluded from bringing causes
of action or defenses that arise out of the same subject matter and might have been
litigated in the previous suit. 42 This is, however, not the practice in all courts.
Several states allow a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to be
adjudicated after divorce, so long as the final decree of divorce did not adjudicate
that tort claim. 143 This seems to be the fairest way in which to deal with the issue of
res judicata, although it does not promote the ever-present goal of judicial economy.
F. Purposefor Recognizing the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context
of marriage furthers numerous goals of tort jurisprudence.' 44 Court awarded
damages serve the goal of corrective justice by helping to restore the moral balance
between the aggressor and the victim. 45 This provides a sense of vindication for

135. Id.
136. Id. at 586.
137. Id. at 576.
138. See supra section H.E.
139. Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claimsfor Intentionally or Recklessly Causing Severe Emotional Distress
in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1253, 1296 (1994).
140. Id.

141. Id. at 1295.
142. Id. at 1295-96.
143. Id. at 1296.
144.

KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14-19 (1997) (stating that the

functions of tort law are corrective justice, optimal deterrence, loss distribution, compensation, and redress of social
grievances).
145. Id. at 14.
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victims who have endured abuse.146 Likewise, allowing victims to pursue civil tort
claims, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, sends a message to the
community that domestic abuse will not be tolerated. Thus, abuse is likely to be
deterred.147 Though a poor
substitute for prior mental well-being, monetary damages
148
do achieve tort goals.
Seeking a monetary judgment, such as damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, is important for victims who have endured financial abuse as part
of an abusive marriage. 149 "One of the tactics that abusers use to control their victims
is to secure access to the couple's finances and to make all budgeting decisions.' 5 °
When an abused spouse who has no means to support herself finally leaves her
abuser, she may be forced to return to him simply because she does not have the
financial resources to support herself.'5 ' It is said that "[t]he most likely predictor of
whether an abused woman will permanently separate from her abuser is whether she
has the economic resources to survive without him."'' 5' The ability to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is thus extremely important for victims
who lose their financial stability as a consequence of leaving their abusers."'
Allowing claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the marital
context is seemingly the most effective means of allowing mentally abused spouses
to recover. While a divorce action may provide escape from tortious abuse, divorce
provides no compensatory relief. 154 In the event that alimony is awarded after the
divorce, it is merely intended to fill the needs of the future, not to compensate for
the wrongs of the past. 155 Civil suits, namely the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, may provide victims with financial remedies for the wrongful
acts of their abusers, potentially covering lost wages, pain and suffering, medical
and psychological treatment costs, and expenses for relocation and protection.'56
There is no substitute for allowing compensation for tortious injury. 157Although
the criminal law may vindicate society's interest in punishing a wrongdoer, it cannot
compensate an injured spouse for her or his suffering or injury. 58 Only a tort suit
can provide the appropriate compensation for a wrongful injury.'59 Additionally,
"[u]nlike a criminal charge which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a civil

146. Melissa J. Pena, The Role of Appellate Courts in Domestic Violence Cases and the Prospectof a New
PartnerAbuse Cause of Action, 20 REv. LITIG. 503, 507 (2001).
147. Id.

148. ABRAHAM, supra note 144, at 14.
149. Pena, supra note 146, at 506.
150. Id.
151.
152.
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153.
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156.
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Id. (citing Barbara Hart, Assessing Whether BarterersWill Kill, in CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:

POLICE RESPONSE 1,2 (Pa. Coalition Against Domestic Violence ed., 1990)).
Pena, supra note 146, at 506.
Henricksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Me. 1993).
Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Me. 1985).
DEBORAH GOELMAN ET AL., WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? EDUCATING TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:

A LAW SCHOOL REPORT 41 (1997).
157. Krohse, supra note 23, at 927.
158. Merenoffv. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (N.J. 1978).
159. Krohse, supra note 23, at 927.
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claim requires proof that it is 'more probable than not' that the tort occurred."' 16 0
When a spouse stops just short of physical abuse, awarding damages for intentional
infliction of emotional
distress may be the only means available to redress the
16
wrongs committed. 1
G. Defining Extreme and OutrageousConduct
In order for conduct to be actionable under New Mexico law, the conduct must
be "extreme and outrageous."' 162 In defining extreme and outrageous conduct, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts comments, "Generally, the case is one in which the
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!"" ' 163 Emotional
distress includes "all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and
65
nausea."'' " Liability only arises where the emotional distress is extreme. 1
Most states recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress; however, as Hakkila proves, states differ widely with regard to what
conduct between spouses they consider to be "outrageous."' 66 Difficulties in67
defining what constitutes outrageous behavior in the marital context plague courts. 1
In attempting to define outrageousness, commentators and courts have concluded
168
that the conduct must be "beyond the normal ebb and flow of married life."'
"When there has been no evidence of physical abuse, it is harder for the courts to
draw the line between emotional distress that qualifies as outrageous behavior, and
behavior that, though not69 'normal' or desired in a marriage, is closer to the 'ebbs and
1
flows of married life."",
The Restatement, in an effort to resolve some of the ambiguity surrounding what
constitutes "extreme and outrageous conduct," describes several factors to
consider. 7 ° First, it directs that "[t]he law intervene[s] only where the distress
171
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.'
Second, the Restatement adds that "intensity and the duration of the distress are
factors to be considered in determining its severity."' 7 2 Finally, it states that "if the
enormity of the outrage carries conviction that there has in fact been severe
emotional distress, bodily harm is not required."' 173 Despite these guidelines, the

160. DEBORAH M. GOELMAN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 6-9
(1996).
161. Taylor, supra note 118, at 1276.
162. Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408, 414, 683 P.2d 963,969 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
163. Id.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(j) (1965).
165. Id.
166. Krohse, supra note 23, at 931.
167. Id.
168. Leonard Karp et al., MaritalTorts: Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flowow nictionof Emotional Distress
in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389, 405 (1994).
169. Krohse, supra note 23, at 933-34.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 460) (1965).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. § 46(k).

Summer 2003]

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

court found
that Mr. Hakkila's ten years of mental and physical abuse were not
17 4 !
actionable.
The Restatement comments that while "[s]evere distress must be proved... in
many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in
itself important evidence that the distress has existed."' 75 It adds, "Normally severe
emotional distress is accompanied or followed by shock, illness, or other bodily
harm which itself affords evidence that the distress is genuine and severe."' 76 While
New Mexico adopted these guidelines, the court of appeals has ultimately ignored
them in the spousal context.'77
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Since the Hakkila decision, states across the country have been confronted with
interspousal intentional infliction of emotional distress claims and have allowed
recovery."' The same year that Hakkila was decided, a Texas appellate court, in
Massey v. Massey, held that there was intentional infliction of emotional distress
when presented with facts strikingly similar to those in Hakkila. In Massey,7 9 the
wife testified that her husband was abusive, explosive, and rageful."8 ° She further
testified that her husband "constantly engaged in verbal abuse such as criticism and
blaming and belittled her in front of her children."'' Additionally, "[h]e had temper
tantrums and physical outbursts which sometimes involved the destruction of
82
property."'
Although her husband stopped short of physical assault, Ms. Massey testified that
his outbursts "caused her to experience intense anxiety and fear.' 8I 3 In addition to
these outbursts, her husband had "tight control over money" and made threats that
she would be "penniless if she divorced him.'' 84 The record reflects that
[h]e doled out small sums of cash-$20 at a time-to [her] for groceries; he
would not let her write checks on their supposedly joint account; and when once
she wrote a check in an emergency, he exploded and told her to never again
come into the bank (where he was president); he bought her clothes and became
enraged when once, on her own, she bought two $75.00 dresses. [She] was
allowed no voice in decisions, financial or otherwise, which affected her. 5
The court held that this conduct was sufficiently outrageous to uphold the finding
18 6
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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8 7 the Supreme Court of South Dakota held
Similarly, in Christiansv. Christians,'
that where a husband treated his wife "less than respectful" by controlling her
behavior regarding use of the vehicles, her job, social life and spending of money,
his conduct was "extreme and outrageous," causing his wife emotional distress for
which she was able to recover damages.18 In South Dakota, the elements for
intentional infliction of emotional distress include (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by defendant, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) a causal
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) severe
emotional distress must result." 9 While New Mexico imposes a similar standard of
proof, the factual threshold of outrageousness set forth by Hakkila is substantially
higher, making it much more difficult to prove a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in New Mexico.
Likewise, in 2001, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that "extreme and
outrageous conduct by one spouse which results in severe emotional distress to the
other spouse should not be ignored by virtue of the marriage of the victim to the
aggressor."'9 ° In McCuIloh v. Drake, 9' the husband began a pattern of abuse shortly
after the couple married.' 92 After various incidents of abuse, the husband held a
pillow over the wife's face, which was the final act that caused her to leave the
relationship.' 93 The trial court reasoned, and the supreme court affirmed, that court
decisions must reflect society's disdain for domestic abuse of any type and that
punitive damages were accordingly appropriate."94 The court went on to say,

The focus of such claims must be on the element of outrageousness, and the
scrutiny must be stringent enough so that the social good which comes from
recognizing the tort in a marital setting will not be undermined by an invasive
flood of meritless litigation. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was so "extreme and outrageous" that it "exceeded all possible bounds
of decency."' 95
The court determined that the defendant's act of holding a pillow over his wife's
face could be reasonably regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery. 9' 6
In a like manner, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in Henriksen v.
Cameron,'9 7 found that the wife established a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress where a husband's actions included
shattering the doors of kitchen cabinets while he "came after" her meanwhile
calling her a "lying, whoring bitch" who was "stealing money from him"; calling
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[her] at a friend's house where she was staying because she was afraid to come
home and threatening to bum down the inn; tearing down a wall in the dining
room before she returned; swaying over her bed and threatening to "get" her;
threatening that [she] would get what his mother got (referring to his father's
beating his mother); and pulling the telephone out of the wall and telling [her]
he did so to prevent her from calling for help. Most of this conduct occurred
while [he] was intoxicated. 98
In finding that the wife had proven a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the court stated that although it did recognize the desire to preserve marital
harmony, there was clearly no marital harmony remaining to be preserved because
the suit was brought after the parties were divorced.'9 9 The jury ultimately awarded
Mrs. Henriksen $75,000 in compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive
damages. 2"
Illinois, too, has awarded damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
between spouses. In Feltmeier v. Feltmeier,2 °' the Appellate Court of Illinois held
that where physical abuse and verbal attacks were present over an eleven-year
marriage, the conduct was extreme and outrageous enough to recover damages. 202
Mrs. Feltmeier repeatedly found herself on the receiving end of verbal attacks and
often had objects hurled in her direction. 2 3 Additionally, her husband systematically
isolated her from friends and family, and when she took action to rid herself of the
abuse, he stalked her.2 °"
During trial, Mr. Feltmeier unsuccessfully argued that since his abuse occurred
only three or four times per year over the course of eleven years of marriage, his
behavior constituted "marital conduct that any reasonable wife should be able to
endure without suffering emotional distress. 20 5 Mrs. Feltmeier suffered severe
emotional distress and was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder, manifested by depression, fear of other men, and inability to form
relationships with them.z° The court commented that
[t]he mate who is responsible for creating the condition suffered by the battered
victim must be made to account for his actions-all his actions. Failure to allow
affirmative recovery under these circumstances would be tantamount to the
courts condoning the continued abusive treatment of women in the domestic
sphere.20 7
"Mindful that this kind of tort deserves circumscription in the marital setting," the
court found that Mrs. Feltmeier stated a proper cause of action for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 0 8
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In Behringer v. Behringer,"° a case demonstrating that both men and women
have the ability to inflict emotional distress, the court held that the wife's conduct
was sufficiently extreme and outrageous so as to cause her husband severe
emotional distress.2"' Mrs. Behringer inflicted emotional distress upon her husband
in a number of ways. She would often wake him from his sleep to tell him that God
was going to give him cancer or a heart attack.21 She persistently claimed that she
knew a hitman that would kill or badly beat Mr. Behringer, hired private
investigators to follow her husband, and played a number of other mind games.2 2
On one occasion she woke her husband from his sleep at 1:30 A.M. by bursting
into the room accusing him of stealing a book from her purse. 213 After leaving the
room to supposedly search the house for the book, she returned, pulling a gun from
behind the dresser. 1 4 She pointed it at her husband, threatening him with "I think
I'll just shoot you" and pulling the trigger several times." 5 Although the gun was
later discovered to be a toy, it closely resembled a .38 caliber pistol of Mr.
Behringer's that his wife had recently taken.216 After threatening to kill her husband,
Mrs. Behringer declared, "Since everybody thinks I'm crazy, I can kill you and they
won't do nothing to me."2 7 The court found that Mrs. Behringer's behavior was
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a finding of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.2 Is
IV. ANALYSIS
Throughout its history, New Mexico has been a forerunner in the area of
interspousal torts. 219 Four years before the Restatementrecognized the legal demise
of interspousal immunity, New Mexico had abolished interspousal immunity for
intentional torts. 22' Two years prior to this Restatement, New Mexico abolished
interspousal immunity for negligently inflicted torts.22' Unfortunately, in Hakkila,
the New Mexico court took a step backward when it effectively made it impossible
to prove the substantive elements necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress between spouses.
Although New Mexico has adopted the Restatement's definition of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, its application of the law in Hakkila set the factual
standard of proof so unreasonably high that it has the effect of precluding all claims
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Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 214, 531 P.2d 947, 948 (N.M. 1975). See supra note 220.
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for intentional infliction of emotional distress between spouses. Hakkila explicitly
acknowledged the possibility of setting the threshold of outrageousness "so high in
the marital context as to bar all suits" '222 but failed to realize that in deciding the case
as it did, it effectively placed New Mexico in that very category. If a husband's
continuous assaulting, battering, demeaning, and insulting of his wife over a tenyear period fails to meet the requisite standard of outrageousness for an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim in New Mexico, the court must ask itself what
conduct would rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to prove this claim.
In making the standard of proof so burdensome as to bar all claims, New Mexico
has fallen out of step with other states.223 Facts similar to those in Hakkila have
consistently been found to meet the requisite standard of outrageousness in other
jurisdictions.224 While other states have recognized the gravity of psychological
abuse, New Mexico continues to permit spouses to lawfully inflict mental
anguish.225
Not only is Hakkila inconsistent with other states, it is inconsistent with New
Mexico's own body of law.226 In Dominguez, the court established that where an
employee proved that the employer made comments about her inability to perform
her job based on her ethnicity, the requisite proof of intentional infliction of
emotional distress was established.227 The court in Dominguez decided that a
material issue of fact existed based on one encounter. Mrs. Hakkila' s abuses seem
to be at least as emotionally disturbing as the plaintiffs in Dominguez. Being
verbally abused by a spouse for ten years should certainly be found to cause
emotional distress comparable to that experienced by Dominguez.
A decade later, it is time for New Mexico courts to rethink the impossibly high
standard set by Hakkila. "Emotional distress is as real and tormenting as physical
pain. '' 2 1 It is imperative that New Mexico begin to provide redress for those
individuals who have suffered psychological abuse.229 While bruises and scrapes
may heal, psychological damages linger on long after.230 Women who are
psychologically harmed should not have to show more than Mrs. Hakkila in order
to recover damages under the law. Psychological well-being deserves as much legal
protection as physical well-being.2
V. CONCLUSION
New Mexico's high threshold for what constitutes outrageous conduct makes
proving a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress nearly impossible.
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Until Hakkila, intentional infliction of emotional distress was quickly developing
into a remedy for spouses who suffered emotional abuse. The rationales used by the
New Mexico Court of Appeals no longer apply to the society in which we live.
Other jurisdictions have recognized this tort for years without experiencing the
adverse effects that the court raised in Hakkila. The current majority formulation of
intentional infliction of emotional distress has adequate safeguards to dispel
arguments that the detrimental aspects of recognition of the tort would outweigh the
benefits.232 New Mexico courts should strictly interpret the law regarding intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the context of interspousal relations.

232. Taylor, supra note 118, at 1280.

